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This article focuses on perceived coordination quality among Norwegian civil servants. It 
explains how they assess the quality of coordination in their own field of work along different 
dimensions. To what degree have such perceptions changed over the past 10 years and  what 
can explain the variations in perceived coordination quality from a structural and a cultural 
perspective? The data base is a comprehensive survey in ministries and central agencies. The 
civil servants perceive coordination as better within their own policy area than across 
administrative levels and policy areas. The perceptions are rather stable over time. The most 
important factors for understanding variations in coordination quality are coordination capacity, 












The dynamics of modern public sector reform waves, from structural fragmentation in NPM to 
attempts at structural reintegration in post-NPM, have resulted in a renewed interest in 
coordination in the government apparatus (Christensen and Lægreid 2007, Bouckaert, Peters 
and Verhoest 2010). Coordination is very high on the contemporary reform agenda in many 
European countries (Wegrich and Stimac 2014, Lægreid et al. 2014).  In addition an increasing 
number of wicked issues and policies have emerged that transcend organizational boundaries 
and pose challenges related to the leadership and organization of the public administration 
(Lægreid et al. 2015). Coordination capacity and quality is a key precondition for governments 
to address such complex governance and policy challenges in the modern state (Lodge and 
Wegrich 2014). In a broad survey conducted between 2013 and 2015, top civil servants in 
ministries and central agencies in Europe were asked to assess the importance of various reform 
trends in their own specific policy field, and they ranked enhanced collaboration and 
coordination as the most important measure (Lægreid et al. 2016b). Hierarchical command is 
the most common coordination mechanism in central government, but heterogeneity may 
necessitate negotiations among actors with diverse interests (March and Olsen 1983), and 
related network arrangements, such as cross-cutting work and project groups and policy 
arrangements and programs, are also rather common (Osborne 2010, Lægreid et al. 2014). 
The main governance doctrine in many countries is the principle of ministerial 
responsibility. This principle tends to produce strong administrative silos with relatively good 
vertical coordination within each policy area but weak horizontal coordination across policy 
areas (Pollitt 2003). Another strong governance doctrine is local self-government, which tends 
to enhance coordination within jurisdictions at local (and regional) level, but produce 
coordination challenges between the central and local government. New Public Management 
reforms have mainly been preoccupied with vertical coordination and have tended to aggravate 
rather than ameliorate the mismatch between vertical and horizontal coordination within 
government (Gregory 2003). Recently, NPM reforms have been supplemented by a variety of 
post-NPM reforms (Reiter and Klenk 2018), with differing degrees of formalization, from 
mergers through networks and partnerships between the public and private sectors and between 
central and local government – to diverse nudging strategies for collaboration (Lodge and 
Wegrich 2016).  
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This article will focus on perceived coordination quality in ministries and central agencies 
in Norway. It will describe and explain how civil servants in central government perceive 
coordination quality, by addressing the following questions: 
 How do civil servants assess the quality of coordination in their own field of work along 
different dimensions (internal-external, vertical-horizontal)? 
 To what degree have such perceptions changed over the past 10 years? 
 How can one explain the variations in perceived coordination quality from a  structural 
and  a cultural perspective? Is there a stable explanatory pattern between 2006 and 2016? 
In the following, the concept of coordination is first explained and then the theoretical 
perspectives and method outlined. Then the main results and patterns are described and 
analyzed.  
 
Conceptual clarification – coordination 
The quest for coordination is an old issue in organization theory, with the focus here on 
structural or organizational coordination. Gulick (1937) stressed that the structure of public 
organizations is built on the dynamic between specialization and coordination. Units, roles and 
tasks are specialized according to different horizontal and vertical principles, and coordination 
is often meant to realign what is specialized, as was evident, for example, in New Zealand’s 
reform dynamics between NPM and post-NPM in the 1980s and 1990s (Gregory 2003). 
Coordination and specialization seem therefore to go in tandem (Bouckaert, Peters and 
Verhoest 2010). Balancing specialization and coordination has been characterized as a search 
for the Holy Grail or ‘the philosophers’ stone’(Gulick (1937, 31). But, they have sought in vain. 
There is apparently no ‘one most effective system’ or ‘one size fits all’ in organizing public 
administrations. Coordination has been one of the most poorly understood and the least 
examined problems for government since its inception according to B.G Peters (2015).  
Coordination is a multidimensional, contested and somewhat ambiguous concept 
(Peters 2006).  In the intra- or inter-organizational context of government systems, coordination 
can be defined as the purposeful alignment of units, roles, tasks and efforts in order to achieve 
a predefined goal (Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest  2010). It is about adjustment of actions and 
decisions among interdependent actors to achieve specified goals (Koop and Lodge 2014). 
Coordination is, therefore, seen both as a process facilitating cooperation and as output – in the 
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form of effective collaboration. In this article, the dependent variable is measured as the 
perceived quality of coordination along different dimensions.  
Coordination is often considered as a solution to transboundary wicked problems and as 
an instrument to tackle problems of capacity and legitimacy in the public sector (Head and 
Alford 2013, Lægreid et al. 2014, 2015). Choosing between different means of coordination 
entails prioritization and carries both advantages and risks, such as increasing complexity and 
hybridity (Christensen and Lægreid 2010). Coordination often plays out as a combination of 
hierarchy, negotiations/networks and markets. On the one hand, networks, consultation or 
‘smart practices’ (Bardach 1998) can be non-hierarchical, as they make responsibilities less 
clear and thus disrupt the chain of command. On the other hand, networks are often constrained 
by hierarchy and operate in the shadow of hierarchy. 
Wicked problems involve a risk of ‘coordination underlap’ (Koop and Lodge 2014); 
when a particular policy issue falls between the boundaries of different government 
organizations. This means that they become a responsibility of none, i.e. ‘blind spots’ 
(Christensen 2018). Or, on the contrary, wicked issues may involve competition among 
different public organizations and ‘coordination overlap’. This implies that a policy issue is of 
relevance for several different organizations and all want to be involved in policy making. Seen 
from a collective point of view, this may mean that resources are used unnecessarily, because 
of ‘turf wars’ (Voorn, Van Genugten and Van Thiel, forthcoming).  
The problems of underlap and overlap are often related to the actions of higher-level 
leadership and may be solved through organizational redesign or reorganization. Coordination 
is therefore a central aspect in the understanding of how larger systems handle the challenges 
of collective action (Hood 2005). The increased focus on coordination is linked to an increasing 
emphasis on the complexity and hybridity of wicked problems (Christensen et al. 2016). Such 
problems enhance the need for contingent coordination, collaborative governance and network 
approaches (Ansell and Gosh 2008, Kettl 2003), demanding interconnected administrative 
responses. 
New coordination measures, broadly connected to post-NPM, often focus on efficiency, 
increased capacity to cope with wicked problems, and better public sector services. They belong 
broadly to the same family of measures, but have numerous shapes and names, e.g. integrated 
governance, joined-up government (Bogdanor 2005), holistic governance, new public 
governance (Osborne 2010), networked government, partnerships, horizontal management, 
collaborative public management, collaborative governance, whole-of-government, etc. 
(Lægreid et al.  2014). The development of these measures produces complex and hybrid 
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administrative arrangements as they place new layers on top of pre-established forms rather 
than replacing them, in a complex pattern of deinstitutionalization and institutionalization of 
reform elements (Christensen and Lægreid 2009). Hybrid structures following different 
organizational principles may bridge new coordination means and traditional sector-based 
arrangements and be a fruitful way to handle the ‘coordination paradox’, i.e. vertical 
coordination measures may counteract horizontal coordination (Egeberg and Trondal 2016). 
However, the performance and effects of these practices are often mixed and uncertain, and 
there is a trade-off between potential gains through flexibility and disadvantages through 
ambiguity, tensions and conflicts (Lægreid et al. 2015). 
Coordination is crucial for governance capacity and quality because it shapes program 
design and influences efficiency gains, which in turn influence governance legitimacy 
(Christensen, Lægreid and Rykkja 2016). But the need for improved coordination is not easily 
resolved, because new coordination measures imply new potential challenges for public 
administration and public policy-making, such as erecting new structural boundaries in addition 
to and potentially counter-acting the old ones (Pollitt  2003). Moreover, there is also the 
question of whether too much is coordinated, which may have negative consequences for the 
public at large. Reformers often have to choose between equally attractive but logically 
incommensurate alternatives (Wildavsky 1987). Coordination instruments are thus based on 
judgments and discretionary balancing of competing values and are therefore a question of 
politics, priorities and power and not merely of logistics or technical considerations (Lindblom 
1965). Coordination can, therefore, be controversial and lead to debate and conflicts, where 
some actors potentially may lose and others gain influence (Moe 2005).  
In this article, it is distinguished analytically between coordination capacity as an 
independent variable on the one hand and coordination quality relations as dependent variables 
on the other hand. Coordination capacity refers to administrative capacity within civil servants’ 
fields of work when it comes to getting actors to collaborate and to cooperate (Lodge and 
Wegrich 2014); this can vary on a scale from very good to very poor.  It includes resources for 
coordination and pre-existing formal structural and procedural features of the administrative 
apparatus aimed at bringing together disparate organizations to engage in joint action. 
Coordination quality, on the other hand, is the perceived quality of coordinating activity as it 
works in practice within the civil servants’ field of work along different dimensions. 
Coordination quality as a concept reflects both the functioning of the coordination process and 
its outcomes (Lægreid et al.  2016). In terms of coordination as a process, the focus is on 
different dimensions of coordination, such as vertical and horizontal. In terms of coordination 
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as a result, the focus is more on civil servants’ perceptions of policy coherence in their own 
policy field and on whether it has improved or deteriorated in recent years.  
From an instrumental perspective, one would normally expect large coordination 
capacity to enhance the quality of actual coordination practice. It is distinguished between two 
dimensions when assessing coordination quality: internal and external coordination and 
vertical and horizontal coordination (Table 1) (Christensen and Lægreid 2008: 102; Egeberg 
2012). Internal coordination may refer to coordination in and between governmental actors 
within a political-administrative system, like the central government and civil service, whereas 
external coordination refers to interaction between the government and public or private 
organizations or stake-holders outside of it, e.g. civil society, international organizations or 
municipalities. Vertical coordination is normally more hierarchy-based while horizontal 
coordination is more collegial or networked-based (March and Olsen 1983; Verhoest et al. 
2005). The combination of these dimensions is shown in table 1. 
 
Table 1. Different coordination relations. 




ministries, agencies or policy 
sectors on the same level 
Inter-level coordination between parent 





government and civil society 
organizations/private sector 
interest organizations 
Coordination - a) upwards to 
international organizations or b) down- 
wards to local government  
Source: Christensen and Lægreid (2008, 102). 
 
Theoretical perspectives on coordination 
Coordination is both a structural and a cultural phenomenon. A structural-instrumental 
perspective and a cultural-institutional perspective are used to understand the variation in 
perceived coordination quality and capacity among civil servants (Christensen et al. 2007). 
According to an instrumental-structural perspective, decision-making processes in public 
organizations are influenced by the formal structure (Egeberg 2012, Simon 1957).  It is assumed 
that formal structure matters for coordination quality. It might be the result of strong 
hierarchical steering or negotiations among top political and administrative leaders, who are the 
most important actors, but also of network structures (March and Olsen 1983). A major 
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precondition for such effects is that leaders score high on both political-administrative control 
and rational calculation (Dahl and Lindblom 1953). This implies that they control coordination 
processes, have relatively clear coordinative intentions and goals, choose structures that 
correspond with these goals and have insight into the potential effects of the coordination 
structures chosen. 
 According to Gulick (1937), the challenges of coordination by organization are 
qualitatively different depending on whether the structural specialization is based on purpose, 
process, clientele or geography. For a public administration based on the principle of purpose, 
a main coordinative challenge is getting the different sector administrations to work together 
on cross-sector wicked problems. If process is the basic principle, then getting different 
professions and experts to join or coordinate forces would be the main challenge (Egeberg 
2012).This perspective offers insights into variations in how coordination is experienced by 
civil servants in different policy areas, at different administrative levels, in different positions, 
performing different tasks, and in different coordination structures. The argument is that these 
diverse formal features affect how internally or externally directed their work is, how technical 
or non-technical their tasks are, the number and type of stakeholders they interact with, etc. 
Based on this perspective, different explanatory variables are applied. A general 
expectation is that organizational boundaries matter and that the perceived coordination quality 
will be seen as better within own policy area than across policy areas and administrative levels 
due to weaker organizational boundaries in the first case. First, a distinction is made between 
policy areas according to their transboundary responsibilities. Some ministries have 
coordinating tasks and responsibilities across ministerial areas, while others are more sector-
oriented. A typical transboundary ministry is the Ministry of Finance but also the Ministry of 
Justice and Public Security (societal security issues), the Ministry of Climate and Environment 
(climate issues), the Ministry of Local Government and Modernization, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and the Prime Minister’s Office have some transboundary tasks. It’s expected that this 
especially tap into the problems with horizontal coordination and coordination across 
administrative levels. The main expectation is that civil servants in these ministerial areas will 
perceive transboundary coordination as better than civil servants working in line ministries or 
agencies without such transboundary responsibilities. The reason for this is a combination of 
more resources for coordination and more coordinative experience. On the other hand civil 
servants in these ministries might perceive coordination problems owing to the constraints 
imposed by the principle of ministerial responsibility, which might counteract the effect of 
being overarching ministries. 
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Second, the focus is on administrative levels, which means the hierarchical distinction 
between ministries and agencies. Here the expectation is that coordination quality will be 
perceived as more positive in ministries than in central agencies. This is due to the strength of 
the principle of ministerial responsibility and the resources for coordination by hierarchy, which 
will favour ministries. This is expected to be especially the case when it comes to internal 
coordination within own policy field. 
Third, it is expected variations according to position in the hierarchy. Leaders are 
supposed to have a greater obligation to organize and further coordination, and they will also 
see coordination differently than executive officers lower down in the hierarchy. This leads to 
a general expectation that leaders will score highest in their positive perceptions of a broad 
range of coordination forms, in particular related to the most demanding types of coordination.  
Fourth, the effect of tasks are examined. The main expectation is that civil servants who 
have coordination as their main task or who work with tasks and matters that need collaboration 
across administrative levels and ministerial areas will perceive less coordination problems than 
other civil servants due to their resources and experiences, but also here the principle of 
ministerial responsibility might counteract the effects of having coordinating responsibilities 
especially when it comes to transboundary coordination. This might apply especially to a sector-
oriented central civil service like the one in Norway. 
 Fifth, overall coordination capacity is expected to matter. Civil servants who assess the 
administrative capacity of the public administration within their own field of work to get actors 
to collaborate and cooperate as good will generally assess the various measures of coordination 
quality as better that those who assess coordination capacity as poor. This is a measure that 
expresses the pre-existing formal capacity for coordination while coordination quality delves 
into how the separate and diverse interaction patterns work in practice. 
 Sixth, it is expected that attitudes to coordination reforms  matter. The expectation is 
that civil servants who see coordination-directed reforms as important will assess coordination 
quality within the public sector as better than civil servants who think that such reforms are of 
little relevance. 
Finally, participation in network arrangements is expected to make a difference 
(Christensen, Lægreid and Midtbø 2012). Previous studies have shown that there is a significant 
positive correlation between network-based coordination instruments and perceived 
coordination quality (Lægreid et al. 2016a). Coordination tends to be viewed more positively 
when horizontal network-based measures, like inter-organizational groups, forums and boards, 
are used as coordination instruments. There might, however, be more negative than positive 
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coordination going on if the participants’ main task is to defend their own parent institution 
(Scharpf 1994, Radtke et al. 2016) or if networks mean mostly information sharing and not real 
coordination. Anyhow, the expectation is that civil servants participating in such units will 
perceive coordination quality as better than other civil servants, especially when it comes to 
coordination across policy areas and administrative levels.   
From a cultural-institutional perspective, trust relations, common values and norms, 
meaning a common culture, may facilitate coordination. The development of a public 
organization is seen as based on historical traditions and path-dependency (Selznick 1957, 
Krasner 1988). Actors will think and act according to a logic of appropriateness, not a logic of 
consequence (March 1994). The leadership of a public organization will have a central role in 
socializing and training employees to install a common cultural identity. Coordination in a 
cultural sense might mean to develop a common culture, so that civil servants and their leaders 
share common informal norms and values, which may in turn facilitate coordination in practice 
(cf. Kaufman 1947). This way of thinking is also reflected in the concept of “value-based 
management” (Halligan 2007).  
The introduction and use of NPM reforms meant increased structural fragmentation, but 
also cultural heterogeneity and competition,  and a challenge for leaders under the post-NPM 
reforms is to bring public organizations culturally back together again (Gregory 2003). 
Pragmatic collaboration between public organizations, as reflected in the concept of “smart 
practice” (Bardach 1998), when public organizations collaborate in a rather loose way vis-à-vis 
common clients or users, may also be seen as a way to overcome cultural differences. Instead 
of primarily thinking about the interest and culture of each single public organization, the idea 
is to create a common cultural platform that could generate stronger collective capacity. 
Sometimes it may be necessary to embark on a new cultural path to achieve this (Kingdon 
1984). 
Previous studies have revealed that there is a positive relationship between coordination 
culture and coordination quality along different dimensions (Lægreid et al. 2016b, Christensen 
et al. 2016). Three different sets of cultural variables are used to explain variety in civil servants’ 
perceptions of coordination quality. First, a central precondition for working together towards 
a common cultural goal in the civil service is mutual trust, measured by whether civil servants 
think the level of mutual trust between the ministry and subordinate agencies is high or not. The 
expectation is that a high level of mutual trust will enhance coordination quality, especially the 
vertical coordination within own policy area.  
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Second, whether civil servants’ tasks and areas of responsibility are characterized by a 
high or low level of conflict will supposedly influence coordination quality. The expectation 
here is that a high level of conflict will make coordination more difficult and challenging, 
because it is difficult to find common cultural ground.  
Third, what is typical for the identity of civil servants? The expectation is that civil 
servants scoring high on identification with the public administration as a whole will perceive 
overall higher coordination quality than those who mainly identify with their own ministry or 
agency. This relates primarily to inter-organizational coordination  
 
Context 
Norway is a unitary state with a combination of central control and standardization, and political 
and administrative decentralization.  It has a large public sector and there is a relatively high 
level of mutual trust and understanding between central actors and public-sector organizations 
on different levels (Christensen and Lægreid 2005). Two governance doctrines are central. 
First, the principle of ministerial responsibility, which tends to enhance vertical coordination 
within policy areas, but constrains horizontal coordination between them. It is very effective 
when the problem structure follows the organizational structure, but not when it comes to 
wicked problems of a transboundary nature. Thus, problems of pillarization, 
departmentalization, tunnel vision, and silo attention are main challenges for handling 
transboundary wicked issues (cf. Pollitt 2003). 
Second, the principle of local self-government may enhance coordination within each 
county or municipality, but produce multi-level coordination challenges between regional/local 
and central government. Counties and municipalities are supposed both to make their own 
policies and to implement policies coming from central government. Added to this, there are 
also central government bodies represented at the regional level which are not standardized 
across policy areas and both their inter-organizational coordination and coordination with 
counties/municipalities is a challenge.  
Since the early 1990s, two developments in the Norwegian central government have 
affected the coordination pattern. First, the NPM era involved vertical specialization and the 
creation of single-purpose agencies and local bodies with more autonomy than before, but it 
also increased intra- and inter-organizational horizontal specialization, creating structural and 
cultural fragmentation (Christensen and Lægreid 2007).  Performance management – a related 
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feature – mainly addressed vertical coordination within each sector and ministerial area and 
defocused the horizontal transboundary coordination challenges typical for wicked problems. 
In recent 10-15 years, the NPM reforms have been supplemented by post-NPM reforms 
which seek to enhance integration in the central government apparatus by introducing more 
network arrangements in the shadow of the hierarchy and also by merging agencies and to some 
extent ministries. Compared with other European countries, Norway scores relatively low on 
coordination through the internal administrative hierarchy within each ministerial area  
(Lægreid et al. 2016), and the use of cross-boundary collegial bodies, such as working groups 
and project groups crossing policy areas and administrative levels, is rather common (Lægreid 
et al. 2016, Christensen, Lægreid and Midtbø 2012).  
Norway’s closer integration in the European Union through the Economic Area 
Agreement has also increased the need for external coordination and for a unified Norwegian 
position to be formulated on various policy issues. To facilitate this, eighteen special 
overarching committees have been established covering both ministries and agencies and 
different policy sectors. The members of these committees are civil servants in affected 
ministries and agencies. Since Norway is not a member of the EU, the overall political 
coordination through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is more limited. 
Thus, this contextual situation illustrates the special challenges, reflecting a hybrid 
combination of NPM and post-NPM features, that civil servants in Norwegian ministries and 
central agencies face when handling and assessing coordination issues. The Norwegian case 
illustrates that a number of changes in government have made coordination more difficult and 
that there is an increasing demand for both horizontal and multi-level coordination, which post-
NPM reforms are trying to meet (Peters 1998 and 2004). The expectations based on these 
contextual features are:  
 that internal coordination within own policy area will be seen as relatively good in 
comparison to horizontal coordination across policy areas owing to the principle of 
ministerial responsibility and NPM reforms.  
  that there will be coordination challenges vis-à-vis local and regional government, 
owing to the principle of local self-government,  
 that increased integration into Europe will have strengthened the quality of sectoral 
vertical integration upwards to the international level, and  
 owing to the introduction of post-NPM reforms over the last 10-15 years transboundary 




The data used are taken from two unique comprehensive surveys of civil servants in the 
Norwegian ministries and central agencies, conducted in 2006 and 2016. All civil servants in 
the ministries with at least one year tenure, from executive officers to top civil servants, and a 
representative sample of every third civil servant in the central agencies were included. The 
number of respondents in 2016 was 2322 in the ministries and 1963 in the central agencies. In 
2006, the numbers were 1864 in the ministries and 1452 in the central agencies.  The response 
rate in 2016 was 60% in the ministries and 59% in the central agencies. In 2006, it was 67% in 
ministries and 59% in the central agencies. Overall, this is a high response rate.  
The dependent variables are based on the following set of questions: 
“How would you characterize coordination within your field of work along the following 
dimensions”? 
a. Coordination between different governmental authorities within own ministerial 
area 
b. Coordination with governmental actors in other policy areas 
c. Coordination with regional and local government 
d. Coordination with supranational or international organizations 
e. Coordination with private sector/civil society 
The respondents were asked to rate their perceptions on a scale from 1 (very good) to 5 (very 
poor) on each of the five dimensions; ‘not relevant’ was also an option. The question about 
coordination with the private sector or civil society was only posed to civil servants in the 
ministries in 2016, but the data from 2006 indicate that there are only minor differences between 
perceptions in the ministries and central agencies on this dimension (Christensen and Lægreid 
2008).1  
                                                          
1 Excluded from the analyses are civil servants who do not see coordination on the different dimensions 
as relevant for their own daily work or who did not answer the questions on coordination quality. In 
2016, this varies between 39% of the respondents for coordination within own policy area to 66% for 
coordination with local and regional bodies. In 2006, it varied between 24% for coordination within own 




Coordination quality across time and coordination dimensions  
Table 2 shows, first, a stable pattern over time regarding perceived coordination quality in 
central government. Despite an increased focus on political-administrative coordination in 
different governments’ reform programs and several mergers and centralization reforms in the 
ministries and agencies, the civil servants’ characterization of coordination on all coordination 
measures did not change significantly. In contrast to the thesis about increased integration and 
coordination across policy areas and sectors (Rommetvedt 2017), there are few changes in 
perceptions of increased coordination in central government over time.   
Table 2. Coordination quality in ministries and central agencies. Percentage rating the 
quality as good or very good. 2006 and 2016 
 2006 2016 
Coordination between governmental authorities within own ministerial area 59 61 
Coordination with governmental actors in other  policy areas 38 39 
Coordination with regional and local government 33 33 
Coordination with supranational or international organizations 51 48 
Coordination with private sector/civil society* 38 40 
N (average) 1818 1843 
* Ministries only.   
 
Second, there are interesting variations across coordination dimensions, which remain similar 
over time. Reported coordination quality tends to decrease significantly when crossing 
organizational, administrative levels or sectoral boundaries in the central government 
apparatus. This illustrates a general finding that organizational boundaries in central 
government affect both civil servants’ perceptions and their actual behavior (Christensen et al. 
2018).  The civil servants are much more satisfied with the coordination quality within their 
own policy area than across policy areas or administrative levels. This finding is in line with a 
general trend in Europe (Lægreid et al. 2016).  
Third, the civil servants report better coordination quality upwards towards the 
European or supranational level than downwards to the local and regional levels. The weaker 
coordination downwards with regional and local bodies is a major concern in ministries and 
central agencies and this reflects how coordination is constrained when the principle of 




ministerial responsibility meets local self-governance. In contrast, coordination upwards to the 
European and supranational level tends to work pretty well, which might reflect that the EEA 
agreement is largely based on the principle of specialization by sector or purpose in line with 
the domestic governance style in Norway (Egeberg and Trondal 2016). Even perceived 
coordination quality with the private sector is stronger than with the local level. 
Compared with 16 other European countries, Norwegian top civil servants score 
significantly higher than average on internal coordination quality both vertically within own 
policy area and horizontally across policy areas, and considerably lower on external 
coordination both with local and regional bodies and with stakeholders in the private sector 
(Lægreid et al. 2016).   
The five coordination dimensions are more overlapping and supplementary than 
alternative. There are strong significant positive correlations between them. Pearson R varies 
between .36 and .68 in 2006 and between .42 and .70 in 2016. If civil servants are dissatisfied 
with coordination along one dimension, they also tend to be dissatisfied with coordination along 
other dimensions, and vice versa. Perceived internal coordination problems tend to go in tandem 
with external coordination problems, and vertical coordination problems often overlap with 
horizontal coordination challenges. 
Variation in coordination quality: structural and cultural features 
How to explain the differences in civil servants’ perceptions of coordination quality along the 
different dimensions? This section focuses on how the scores on the different structural and 
cultural variables correlate with the different dimensions on coordination quality. First, we do 
multivariate analyses of the relative importance of the various independent variables for the 
different dimensions of coordination in 2016. Then the pattern in 2016 is compared with the 
pattern 10 years earlier. 
Multivariate analysis 
The multivariate analysis is summed up in Table 3.2 First, the independent variables can overall 
explain more of the variation in perceptions of coordination quality within own policy area and 
across policy areas than that in other dimensions. Second, both structural and cultural features 
                                                          
2 It has been controlled for demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, tenure and education but 




can help to explain variations in perceived coordination quality. Third, the most important 
explanatory factors are coordination capacity and mutual trust. This goes for all five 
coordination dimensions.  Strong coordination capacity has a significant positive effect on 
perceived coordination quality along all dimensions, which was expected. If civil servants 
perceive the administrative capacity within their own policy area to get actors to cooperate and 
collaborate as good, than the perceived coordination quality is  good. If mutual trust relations 
between ministries and subordinate central agencies are strong, then coordination seems to be 
smoother along all quality dimensions horizontally and vertically, internal as well as external. 
 
Table 3. Summary of regression analysis by structural and cultural feature affecting different 
dimensions of coordination quality. 2016. Standardized Beta coefficients. Linear regression. 
Method Enter. 












-Policy field (overarching ministries) 
-Network arrangements 
-Coordination as a main task 
































































































Only variables with significant bivariate correlations are included. 1) Only at ministerial level; * 
Significant  at .05 level; ** Significant at .01 level; *** Significant at .001 level 
 
Fourth, other structural and cultural actors also matter. Administrative level has an effect 
on internal coordination within own policy area, horizontal coordination across policy areas 
and vertical coordination with international bodies. For all these dimensions, the civil servants 
in the ministries perceive coordination as better than those in the agencies do. Policy field also 
makes a difference to the way that civil servants working in overarching ministries perceive the 
quality of coordination across sectors and international coordination as better. Participating in 
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network arrangements also influences the perception of international coordination. Having 
transboundary collaboration tasks matters for coordination within own policy area, across 
policy areas and also with civil society and the private sector.   
Among the cultural variables, level of conflict also matters. Civil servants working on 
policy areas with a high level of agreement normally perceive coordination quality as better 
than those who work on issues involving a lot of conflict. This is especially the case for 
coordination within own policy area, with international bodies and with actors in the private 
sector. Strong identification with central government in general also tends to go together with 
higher perceived coordination quality, especially across policy areas and with regional and local 
bodies.  
Fifth, there is relatively little variation across the different coordination dimensions 
regarding the factors that might explain the variation in the observed patterns. This is not 
surprising given the significant positive correlation among the different coordination 
dimensions. There are, however, marked differences for coordination with regional and local 
authorities and to some degree with private sector bodies which is interesting and support the 
role of context in this study. Coordination downwards to the regional and local levels is mainly 
affected by coordinating capacity, and to some extent by mutual trust relations between 
ministries and central agencies, and identification with central government.  
Stability of explanatory factors over time 
If we compare the explanatory factors across time, we find a lot of robustness and stability 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2008, table 6, 110). The pattern is not completely comparable since 
not all explanatory variables are included in both time slots. In particular, the question about 
coordination capacity was not asked in 2006. Nevertheless, in both years we find a combination 
of structural and cultural features as the main explanatory variables, and the demographic 
control variables do not have a strong influence.  
Both in 2006 and in 2016 administrative level is a main explanatory factor when it 
comes to horizontal coordination as well as coordination within own policy area. Generally, 
coordination across policy areas as well as within own policy sector is perceived as better in 
ministries than in central agencies both in 2006 and in 2016. To some extent, this also goes for 
coordination with international bodies. The same stable pattern occurs for mutual trust relations. 
Along all coordination dimensions, mutual trust is an important explanatory factor both in 2006 
and in 2016. Horizontal as well as vertical coordination and internal as well as external 
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coordination are perceived as significantly better if there is a high level of mutual trust between 
ministries and central agencies.  
Discussion 
The three most important independent variables are coordination capacity, mutual trust and 
administrative level. First, a positive perception of overall coordination capacity correlates 
strongly with all the dimensions of coordination quality. Second, strong mutual trust enhances 
coordination quality. This indicate that structural and cultural variables might  interact and that 
informal cultural integration is important as ‘institutional glue’ that reaches beyond formal 
structural boundaries. Krasner (1988) labels this ‘horizontal width’, meaning that if actors care 
about what is going on in other units in their organizations, this will enhance collective action. 
Third, administrative level means a lot for three of the coordination quality dimensions. These 
results may perhaps be attributed to the fact that ministries have broader coordination tasks than 
agencies and also more resources to handle these tasks. In some ways this result may be seen 
as surprising, since more coordination tasks could have indicated more coordination challenges. 
Lack of a differentiated result on coordination quality at the regional/local level may reflect the 
rather complex organizational structure governing the allocation of authority between the 
central and regional/local levels. Fourth, a low level of conflict is important for improving the 
perceived quality of coordination, because interaction and cultural integration then become 
easier. 
Going back to the expectations based on the Norwegian political-administrative context, 
there are mainly expected results but also some surprises. It was expected a high score on 
perceived internal coordination quality in own policy area, which means mainly the hierarchical 
relationship between ministries and agencies, and that is exactly what we found. This is very 
much a reflection of the ‘siloization’ that is very typical for many European central civil services 
(Pollitt 2003). We also expected challenges in coordination with regional and local government, 
which is reflected in the relatively low scores for coordination quality on this dimension. This 
is due to three factors: firstly, that many ministries have agencies with regional and local 
branches, operating relatively independently of the elected regional bodies and their 
administrations; secondly, lack of overlapping regional branches; and thirdly, the importance 
of the County Governor, i.e., the representative of the central government on the regional who 
enacts many regulatory and coordinating tasks. 
 It was also expected that closer European integration, mainly through the EEA treaty, 
would lead to higher perceived quality of international coordination. This was confirmed, but 
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rather unexpectedly, there is a higher score on this dimension than on horizontal coordination 
between policy areas. This too can be interpreted as showing siloization features, because many 
of the international contacts are transnational and sectorized. The rather mediocre quality of 
cross-sectoral coordination can also be seen as a hindrance to resolving wicked issues. 
 Norway has undergone several major administrative reforms over the last two decades. 
These have been hybrid, but mainly post-NPM inspired (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). A 
police reform in 2015 regionalized the police further, cutting police districts from 27 to 12. The 
Immigration Administration Reform in 2001 established a more independent immigration 
agency and a very independent appeals body. The Hospital Reform in 2002 transferred the 
ownership of hospitals from the county councils to the central state, but also implied delegation 
of authority to regional/local health enterprises. The Welfare Administration Reform in 2005 
merged the agencies for pensions and employment, and on the local level they co-located with 
the social services through partnership arrangements. A collaboration reform intended to 
enhance integration and collaboration between local government as the level responsible for 
primary care and the state as responsible for secondary care and hospitals was introduced in 
2012. During the last few years, there have been major mergers of public sector organizations 
such as municipalities, universities/colleges and central agencies. 
 Despite all these reforms aimed at enhancing coordination, the perceived coordination 
quality on different dimensions has not increased, as expected, but instead has remained stable. 
This is also supported by the fact that coordination reforms in own policy area have not had any 
effect on perceptions of coordination by civil servants in ministries and central agencies. Thus, 
there seems to be a loose coupling between reforms and perceived coordination quality in 
central government. One reason for this may be that coordination quality perceptions are not 
that much influenced by reforms, but more by cultural features and  basic structure of the central 
civil service. This apparent loose coupling may indicate at least three tendencies. One is that 
reforms are not that well designed to respond to coordination challenges. Another is that 
reforms may involve a lot of talk and symbols, which may undermine their instrumental 
qualities (Brunsson 1989). A third reason might be that the strong focus on integration in 
coordination reforms might have neglected the fact that fragmentation might enhance 
coordination under certain conditions (Genschel 1997, Wolbers, Boersma and Groenwegen 
2017). For example, when there is a lot of complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty, sequential 
attention and local rationality might be a fruitful coordination strategy (Cyert and March 1963). 
Even though coordination is a key issue in post-NPM reforms, it is not seen as a ’silver bullet’ 
to improve the public administration’s capacity to act. Also the appropriate specialization and 
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division of labor is an important feature of modern organizations (Christensen and Lægreid 
2007, Reiter and Klenk 2018, Page 2005). 
 There are rather unique time-series related to the surveys. Similarities between the two 
surveys concerning results are first of all the importance of administrative level, where the 
significant results for three of the same dimensions are nearly identical. Method-wise this is 
rather reassuring. Other similarities are the lack of influence of position and having coordination 
as a task, while working in a coordination ministry seems slightly more important in 2016. 
Related to the cultural variable mutual trust is a very important variable for explaining 
variations on all dimensions of coordination quality both in 2006 and 2016. Another similarity 
is some significance of identification with the central government as such. Adding to this both 
in 2006 and 2016 it was also found that demographic variables were of no significance, in line 
with the general findings of variations in perceptions and actions among Norwegian civil 
servants over time (Christensen et al. 2018).  
One difference is that we used more structural variables in 2016 (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2008). The most important of those are overall coordination capacity, but having 
transboundary tasks also yielded higher scores on perceived coordination quality. Involvement 
in network arrangements influenced perceptions of international coordination, while having 
experience of coordination reforms had no influence, which is consistent with the overall 
finding of stability. Among the cultural variables, the existence of conflict was not used in 2006 
and it showed significant results on three of the variables in the dependent dimension in 2016. 
Conclusion 
This article has shown that coordination is important but difficult to achieve, especially 
transboundary coordination (Peters 2015). It has also revealed a coordination paradox. On the 
one hand, major efforts have been made to increase coordination both vertically and 
horizontally and several big reform initiatives have been launched to increase coordination 
between policy areas and administrative levels. On the other hand, perceptions of coordination 
quality among civil servants in ministries and central agencies have been rather stable and 
robust over the past 10 years. One interpretation of this pattern is that as long as the main 
governance doctrines of ministerial responsibility and local self-governance are not challenged, 
the leeway for increasing coordination between policy areas and administrative levels is limited. 
Another interpretation, linked to this, is that coordination is not only a logistical and technical 
issue, but also a political issue. Coordination is about power relations. Civil servants generally 
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prefer to coordinate than to be coordinated. As long as power relations are not changed, the 
room for increased coordination is limited. This brings us to the third point: Context matter for 
coordination quality, such as governance doctrines and integration into the EU. A fourth 
interpretation is that one should be careful not to expect too much from big structural reforms 
(Aberbach and Christensen 2014). Often reform agents tend to oversell the reforms and promise 
more than they can deliver (Patashnik 2008). This is especially problematic when their means-
end knowledge is rather weak, which is not uncommon in reform processes. Thus, a cautious 
approach might be wise. 
 When it comes to explaining variations in coordination quality, it is distinguished 
between ‘hard’ structural/formal explanations and ‘soft’ cultural features. The main finding is 
that both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ measures matter. First of all, cultural features such as mutual trust, 
conflict and identification affect the coordination pattern.  If one wants to improve coordination, 
an important lesson is to take cultural features into consideration. This means that the trust-
based reforms that is seen in other Nordic countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, might be a 
way forward (Aspøy 2016, Bringselius 2018). One problem with this is that culture is not easy 
to change, especially in the short term. However, it is also shown that cultural features need to 
be complemented by structural features. It is especially important to strengthen coordination 
capacity. Good government means a high trust administration but also an administration with 
capacity, in this case coordination capacity, to ensure effective service delivery and the 
implementation of public policies. The structural arrangements can both constrain and enable 
coordination quality. Perceived coordination quality varies with organizational boundaries and 
especially with the administrative capacity to get different actors to collaborate and cooperate 
within and across different areas.  
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